Real iPhone capturesProtocol 0.1 test buildEncrypted local history
01 / Chats / local history
Pick up the conversation.
The Chats screen brings together local conversations and encrypted-message counts. A restored account can reopen its existing history without turning the conversation list into a wall of message previews.
When to use it
Find a conversation on this device, check its local history and open it when you want to read. The build banner identifies the test configuration behind this capture.
What matters
Local conversation list
Encrypted-message counts
Restored account and build context
Chats / local history
Captured test build 31, Protocol 0.1. The 43 messages and 584 KB describe this device at capture time, not usage across the service.
02 / Contacts / trust and identity
A name you recognise. A key you verify.
Contacts keeps a local label beside each contact’s verification state. The labels “samsung” and “16e” identify the contacts on this device; changing a label does not change the contact’s cryptographic identity.
When to use it
Use a recognisable local label, then compare the device verification code through a trusted independent channel. A Verified badge records that local confirmation; it is not identity certification by Arctic.
What matters
Local labels stay separate from keys
Verification belongs to the current key
A changed key requires a new comparison
Contacts / trust and identity
The screenshot shows two contacts marked Verified. A screenshot cannot establish that the people behind those contacts were independently verified.
03 / Contact Card / QR import
Exchange a contact card. Keep private keys private.
Scan a QR code, choose its image from Photos or open an image file. The QR carries an Arctic Contact Card: structured information that helps the app address encrypted delivery and identify the peer’s public key.
When to use it
Review a card before adding the contact. A valid QR is a way to exchange contact information, not proof of who sent it. Compare the device verification code before trusting the new contact.
What matters
Camera, Photos or file import
Public key and delivery-routing information
No private key or mailbox retrieval token
Contact Card / QR import
No live QR code is displayed here. In the documented v3 format, the card also carries a contact-scoped, send-only delivery permission. That permission cannot read the mailbox.
04 / Username / discovery preferences
Finding someone is different from trusting them.
An account username is intended to offer a readable way to find a contact. It is distinct from the private labels you assign locally and from the public key used for encryption.
When to use it
Read the current status and discovery control separately from a saved registration result. Once a contact has been resolved, key verification remains a separate step; a matching name does not authenticate a person.
What matters
Account username versus local label
Saved request versus current status
Discovery preference versus verified identity
Username / discovery preferences
This test screen explicitly labels a saved result as not fresh confirmation. Contacts also shows “registration coming later”. These captures do not establish that public username lookup is available.
05 / Privacy / account overview
See what the application is doing.
The Privacy screen groups account readiness, connection details, encrypted storage, unread counts and notification settings. It gives the user one place to inspect those different boundaries.
When to use it
Start here when checking whether the account is ready or looking for a specific privacy control. Open the relevant section instead of inferring every subsystem’s state from one green indicator.
What matters
Account readiness
Connection and storage sections
Local attention and notification controls
Privacy / account overview
This build says messages update automatically while Arctic is open. This capture does not demonstrate continuous background delivery.
06 / Private relay / delivery service
The relay delivers the envelope.
A relay routes and temporarily queues encrypted message envelopes. The client holds the message-decryption keys. The displayed mailbox is a routing identifier; it is different from the protected retrieval credential used to collect its queued envelopes.
When to use it
Inspect the connection and request a relay check. Connection health tells you whether an endpoint responds; it does not prove that a particular message reached another person or was read.
What matters
Encrypted content travels through the relay
Mailbox ID is not a retrieval key
HTTP/3 and HTTP/2 checks are transport diagnostics
Private relay / delivery service
The endpoint and mailbox have been replaced with illustrative values for publication. The original Connected state and diagnostic results are unchanged. The example address is not a live Arctic endpoint.
07 / Encrypted storage / local totals
Understand what stays on your device.
Storage shows aggregate ciphertext counts and sizes, including local media, the outbound queue and incoming staging. These totals can be calculated without opening message previews.
When to use it
Check which stage holds data before cleaning up. The media action clears eligible sent or received photo and voice items locally; text and queued attachments are excluded.
What matters
Encrypted local history
Outgoing queue versus incoming staging
Local media cleanup
Encrypted storage / local totals
These are captured values. Local cleanup is not delete-for-everyone, and removal from an app is not a guarantee that every external or physical copy has disappeared.
08 / Local attention / private notifications
A useful alert without a message preview.
Unread counts and manual reminder marks stay on this device. Protocol 0.1 sends no read receipts. The notification example uses a generic “Arctic — New message” alert without a sender name or message content.
When to use it
Manage what needs attention locally and keep message details off system alerts. Marking a conversation read here does not send a read confirmation to the other person.
What matters
Local unread and reminder state
No read receipts in Protocol 0.1
Generic notification content
Local attention / private notifications
The screen illustrates notification content. It does not establish the delivery timing or reliability of notifications while the app is suspended.
INCLUDED FREE / BUILT-IN MEDIA TOOLS
A different voice. A lighter photo.
Voice transformation and photo compression are part of Messenger’s free feature set. Both are implemented in the current testbed and process media on the device before message encryption.
VOICE / INCLUDED FREE
The Arctic voice effect
Voice notes pass through a local transformation that gives recordings the standard Arctic robotic timbre. The transformed recording is encoded and encrypted before delivery; raw microphone audio is not sent to a voice-processing service.
The current testbed supports clips up to 15 seconds. The effect changes how a voice sounds; it does not guarantee that a speaker cannot be recognised.
PHOTOS / INCLUDED FREE
Smaller images, less metadata
Photos are resized and compressed on the device before encryption. Re-encoding produces a new JPEG without the original GPS/EXIF fields, reducing the data sent and keeping source camera metadata out of that outgoing copy.
Photos are compressed toward a target size of 512 kB, with a maximum of about 524 KB per image. Compression can reduce image detail; visible information within the picture remains visible to its recipient.
PRODUCT DIRECTION / FREE AND PAID FEATURES
Everyday tools. More ways to make it yours.
Our product model keeps voice transformation and photo compression free. Planned paid additions will expand shared conversations and personalisation.
PLANNED / PAID CONVERSATION FEATURES
Groups and shared chat spaces
Create spaces for a community, project or team to talk together. Group creation and expanded shared-chat capabilities are planned paid features, separate from the one-to-one conversation flow shown in this testbed.
PLANNED / PERSONALISATION
Arctic emoji and cosmetic collections
A distinctive set of Arctic emoji and optional cosmetic additions will give conversations their own character. Premium collections and appearance options are part of the planned paid offering.
Groups, shared chat spaces and cosmetic collections are in the product roadmap. Final packages, prices and release dates have not been announced; these additions are not demonstrated by the current screenshots.
FOR ORGANISATIONS / PLANNED PAID SERVICE
Your teams. Your dedicated relay network.
For organisations planning private employee groups and chat spaces, we intend to offer separately priced relay deployments. Servers would be provisioned for the company in agreed locations, with its messaging traffic assigned to that dedicated network.
DEDICATED INFRASTRUCTURE
Relay locations matched to your teams
For a company with offices in two countries, the proposed setup places dedicated VPS relay nodes in both agreed locations. Corporate clients would be configured to use those company-assigned relays, with no automatic fallback to the shared public relay pool.
ENCRYPTED SERVER LINKS
A private tunnel across the internet
An authenticated, encrypted VPN tunnel would link the company’s relay nodes across the public internet. It adds protection to inter-server traffic while message contents remain encrypted for their recipients.
OFFICE A / COUNTRY A
Encrypt on the employee’s device
The client prepares an encrypted message and connects to a company-assigned relay over a protected connection.
DEDICATED RELAYS / A ↔ B
Transport through the tunnel
The company’s VPS nodes exchange encrypted envelopes through their authenticated VPN link. Relays are not given message-decryption keys.
OFFICE B / COUNTRY B
Open on the recipient’s device
The authorised recipient receives the envelope through the dedicated network and decrypts the message locally.
How would the corporate service be scoped?
The paid deployment would be agreed around company locations, capacity, administration and support needs. Employee membership, group key management and relay access policy require their own implementation and validation before this service can launch.
Server locations describe where the relay nodes are hosted. They do not guarantee that every internet packet stays within those countries. Routing, operational metadata, retention and failover would be defined explicitly for each deployment.
Why use a VPN as well as message encryption?
Message encryption protects content from the sender’s device to authorised recipients. The server-to-server VPN protects the connection between relay nodes. The tunnel does not require relays to decrypt the message body, and it does not replace client authentication or recipient-key verification.
Deployment concept for a future paid corporate offering. Dedicated corporate routing, employee groups and inter-relay VPN links are not live service claims for the current testbed.
NAMES, CARDS AND KEYS
Four different jobs. One contact.
01 / LOCAL LABEL
How you recognise them
A label in your local contact list. It is presentation, not a public account name or a cryptographic identity.
02 / USERNAME
How you may find them
A readable account name in the developing discovery flow. Availability depends on the current service and build; a saved result is not fresh confirmation.
03 / CONTACT CARD
How the app addresses them
A QR or contact link carries public identity and delivery information. It gives no permission to retrieve the recipient’s mailbox.
04 / VERIFICATION CODE
How you check the key
Compare the code through a trusted independent channel. A changed peer key clears its prior verification state.
ENCRYPTION AND DELIVERY
Content is encrypted before the relay receives it.
Protection comes from separate layers: verifying a contact, encrypting message content, protecting the transport connection and encrypting local storage. Each layer has a specific job.
01 / SENDER DEVICE
Compose and encrypt
Arctic Core seals the message for the peer before it enters the delivery path.
02 / RELAY
Route and queue
The service handles an encrypted envelope and delivery state. It is not supplied with the endpoint keys needed to open the message body.
03 / RECIPIENT DEVICE
Verify and open
The recipient’s client verifies and decrypts the message for display. Local history retains encrypted message bodies.
Which encryption does the current testbed use?
Protocol 0.1 uses X25519 key agreement, HKDF-SHA-256 key derivation and XChaCha20-Poly1305 authenticated encryption, with a fresh random nonce for each message. TLS protects the connection to the service; it is separate from the encryption of the message body.
The active protocol uses long-term pairwise keys and does not provide forward secrecy. Compromise of the relevant long-term private-key material can endanger recorded past messages. This remains a limitation of the current testbed.
What can the relay and network still observe?
The relay processes routing and mailbox state, encrypted envelope sizes, expiry and acknowledgments. The exact information available depends on its role. Network observers can see connection addresses, timing and traffic volume.
Keeping message content encrypted does not make all metadata invisible. A relay health check also says nothing about whether a recipient has read a particular message.
How is local history protected?
The documented clients store ciphertext message bodies within a SQLCipher-encrypted database, using an independent database key held through platform secure storage. Identity keys are protected through iOS Keychain or, on Android, a Keystore wrapping key.
Reading and composing require temporary plaintext on the device. The app clears buffers it owns across privacy boundaries, but cannot promise to erase every copy made by the operating system, keyboard or UI framework. End-to-end encryption cannot protect displayed content from an attacker controlling an unlocked endpoint.
What is being developed for the next version?
The current app is a working testbed for connectivity, encrypted delivery and application behaviour. Work and testing on the next product generation are active, including a separate session-encryption programme.
The Session 0.2 candidate remains disabled in the active client protocol. Its development tests are not a production security approval. Independent cryptographic and mobile-security review, migration and device-lifecycle evidence remain necessary before activation.
PART OF ARCTIC FRONTIER SYSTEMS
Communication. With an operational view.
Messenger carries encrypted conversations. Relay Monitor helps an operator inspect infrastructure health and peer connections. Its measurements are separate from message content and do not prove message delivery.
Screens shown from the owner’s Protocol 0.1 test build. Relay connection identifiers are replaced for illustration; application states are preserved. This page describes development work, not an independently audited production release.